. The workshop is a biannual affair which at each meeting addresses a core interdisciplinary topic in artificial intelligence (AI) and cognitive science. The special topic for the conference, and book, is the frame problem. The papers in the book incorporate an interdisciplinary approach drawing from AI, cognitive science, psychology and philosophy. The book is quite formal and some chapters require a background in logic, computer science and AI principles-although a few will appeal to the general reader. There is a six-page introduction by the editors that provides a brief synopsis of the frame problem and related problems as well as a brief organization and summaries of the papers presented in the book.
Introduction
The frame problem originally emerged from McCarthy's situation calculus and was first identified by McCarthy and Hayes in 1969 . The conceptual framework of the situation calculus involved the basic idea that changes of sr&es in the world are caused by actions. The frame problem came about as a formal representation problem stemming from the design and implementation of intelligent systems. The term frame itself arose from McCarthy's conception of a system of frames or, "frames of reference". Each frame comprised properties, known as Buents, to which the consequences of an action would not affect the entire frame, only parts of it:
. if a person has a telephone he still has it after looking up a number in the telephone book. If we had a number of actions to be performed in sequence, we would have quite a number of conditions to write down that certain actions do not change the values of certain fluents. In fact with n actions and m fluents we might have to write down mn such conditions. We see two ways out of this difficulty. The first is to introduce the notion of frame, like the state vector in McCarthy (1962) . A number of fluents are declared as attached to the frame and the effect of an action is described by telling which fluents are changed, all others being presumed unchanged. (McCarthy & Hayes, 1969, p. 38) The phrase, all others being presumed unchanged, is the crux of the original frame problem. It was quickly discovered that presuming any aspect of the world to be unchanged, and representing those presumptions, was a very deep problem. The frame problem also gave rise to a lineage of related problems which were grounded in the same conceptual framework regarding states and actions in the world. In addition to the many subtle variations of the original frame problem, which will be explicated later in the survey of the book, the most noteworthy of these descendants are the qualification, ramification and persistence problems. The quali$cation problem involves the inability to specify enough preconditions to merit the validity of an action in any given state. The ramification problem entails the inability to specify all the side effects of an action. The persistence problem is the problem of representing which facts endure and which cease to endure from one state to the next.
Goals of the review
In the introductory chapter of the book, "Framing the Problem", a brief history, as well as two basic kinds of frame problem are highlighted by the editors. The first type is the original McCarthy & Hayes (1969) narrow frame problem which is strictly defined as a representation problem of artificial intelligence (AI). The representational nature of the narrow frame problem entails the problem of finding an appropriate means of describing the absence of change between states. The typical representations associated with the narrow frame problem include data, or "knowledge", structures such as multi-attribute schemas and predicates in logic. The second type is the broad frame problem, which captures the idea that the frame problem might be solved by concentrating on computational resources and control structures rather than representations.
The broad frame problem also appears, however, to take in topics of a more expansive nature including: the relationship between representation and computation, laws of motion, philosophy and potential bridges between human and machine cognition. Regarding the issue that tugs at representation and computation for instance: If an electromechanical reasoning agent were to be endowed with boundless computational resources, one argument against this kind of broad solution (Hayes, 1987) maintains that the agent would still lack the ability to make inferences about changes between states since such computations would be performed on what are presumed to be ineffective representations, such as frame axioms, vis-a-vis the narrow frame problem. Thus, exploration into new and different aspects of computability might or might not lead to a "solution" to the frame problem. By applying this narrow/broad distinction to the book, the editors classify the contributions of Haugh, Morgenstem, Tenenberg, Weber and Weld as closer to the narrow frame problem. The chapters by Nutter and Perlis assume the broader stance. The remaining eight chapters are left unclassified by the editors. In general, as witnessed by the myriad approaches and opinions discussed in the book, it is safe to say that a consensus built towards what the frame problem actually is, becomes sorely lacking:
The frame problem poses a frustrating and tantalizing enigma. It has been defined very tightly, and so loosely that it seems to be the entire problem of cognition. It has been viewed as absolutely central and as artifactual. It has been characterized as essentially an issue of complexity and as an issue to which questions of complexity are irrelevant. It is hardly surprising that some people doubt that it is there at all. (Nutter, p. 171) ' For the purposes of this review, whenever I use the term "frame problem", I am referring to any known treatment of the frame problem. Otherwise, I will explicitly refer to a particular instance or descendent of the frame problem by name (e.g., "the qualification problem"). Given the breadth and discontinuity of opinions provided by the various contributors, what one will most likely not gain from the book is a sense of closure regarding the frame problem. What the reader will most likely acquire is an enhanced appreciation for the depth and complexity of this problem and perhaps a renewed insight into one's own particular realm of interest-even if only remotely related to the frame problem. The title of the book, Reasoning Agents in a Dynamic World, and the series to which it belongs, Advances in Human and Machine Cognition, imply to me a particular setting for the frame problem. In particular I interpret these to mean a coupling of the common qualities which human cognition (i.e., cognitive science) and machine cognition (i.e., artificial intelligence) share as both divergent and convergent disciplines. I kept this in mind as I read the book and have also adopted this conceptual union as the basic theme of this review. Therefore, my goals in this review are:
l in Section 2, to provide a general survey of some of the major contributions in the book; l in Section 3, to discuss and to establish how the myriad ideas advanced by contributors in the book interact with specific scientific methodologies regarding human and machine cognition. Clarifying my second goal: Upon reading the book, I have been able to surmise that the frame problem, rather than an end in itself, is actually a symptom of the method by which the researcher in AI or cognitive science chooses to characterize, through abstraction, the relationship between the reasoning agent and its environment. This L All nondated name and page references refer to the book. next as the result of an action. The following expression is an example of a frame axiom in a simple world involving blocks:
If block x has a color c in situation S, and situation S,+r results from moving block x in S,, then block x will have the same color c in ,$,+I. (Morgenstern, p. 135) Simply put, a block in this pedagogical world does not change color as the result of being moved. In order for this frame axiom to work however, one kind of omniscient assumption that must be made is that nothing else can occur between states other than what is described by this frame axiom regarding the block's color c. This omniscient assumption holds that, "all intervening events are known" (Haugh, p. 110) . For example, if a five year old child, holding a full, quality-assured can of spray paint of a different color c' were to come along between the states S,, and &+I, and paint the block x to the new color c', the frame axiom described a moment ago would be rendered invalid. In turn, if other frame axioms were to depend on the validity of this frame axiom, the constancy of a particular color c, those would also become invalid. One can see how the reasoning agent could rapidly become confused if events in the world did not occur exactly as prescribed. A reasoning agent equipped with the situation calculus and frame axioms, or even with a more recent representation in AI or cognitive science, can only truly function with the assumption of omniscience. Other varieties of omniscience will be covered later in the survey of Haugh's chapter in Section 2.3.
In a sense omniscience is a fallacy since a biological or electromechanical reasoning agent cannot possibly be aware of everything that transpires around it. Nevertheless, omniscience mandates that the agent be aware of everything and that this awareness must be represented and maintained internally by the reasoning agent. Hence, in general, if any representation-related change in the world occurs, it must be acknowledged by the electromechanical agent; and, in turn, the corresponding internal representation that is maintained to describe the agent's model of the world must also be updated to reflect this change. The agent cannot be made aware on a "need to know" basis. In the case of the simple scenario presented above, whenever block x in S,, is moved in the world, either by the reasoning agent or as the result of some other external cause, information about the block's new state in S,+i must be propagated to the corresponding internal representation in the reasoning system, from #S, to #S,+r (the '#' symbol denotes "in the mind of the agent"). The formalism of situation theory (Devlin, 1991; Barwise & Perry, 1983) effectively represents this principle of external-internal correspondence, as depicted in Fig. 1 . Moreover, this new internal information must be exhaustively propagated, and verified, among all the other objects in the internal representation in order to curtail any potential conflicts and contradictions.
For instance, two different blocks cannot occupy the same x, y, z location at the same time. This intricate practice of bookkeeping, in particular, has been one of the main thrusts of the nonmonotonic reasoning research community. In the review of Perlis' and Goodwin & Trudel's chapters, potential uses for the maintenance of co-existing, conflicting values of properties will be explicated.
Even if the world of the electromechanical reasoning agent involves thousands or millions of objects, because of omniscience, each relevant external object, {~a,. . J,}, J,,,} to internal representations {io.. .,i,,,} from one to the next n + 1.
must be mapped to a unique corresponding internal representation, {ic,. . .,i,}. 
. D&in, 1991) illustrates how this omniscient mapping is maintained from the transition of one pair of external-internal states {S,,,#S,} to the next, {S,,+t,#S,+t}. Note in Fig. 2 how each external object x is mapped, via the vertical arrow, to its corresponding internal representation. The "mapping" referred to pertains not so much to individual objects, but more importantly, to the properties which make up an agent's conception of an object. Like the property of color mentioned before, other examples of properties might involve the physical location of one object, spatial orientations between two or more objects, ownership of a set of objects, absolute and relative velocity, and so forth. An external event is a perceivable change in one or more properties related to one or more objects.
Actions such as those in the situation calculus, are only one of many phenomena that might give rise to events. As external events occur, which cause the transitions from one external state S,, to the next S,+t , the internal representation must be expressive enough to represent the changes which occur within and between the actual properties used to describe external objects. Objects in and of themselves do not change, rather the unique properties that describe and individuate objects change. In the situation calculus and other representations of AI and cognitive science, the properties of objects that are subject to change, via events and actions, do so owing to the principle of causality. Thus, some force or entity is always responsible for effecting the change of a property from a value to a different value. The force, or cause, that results in a change might originate in the mind of the agent (#S) , such as in the generation of a new goal based on the current circumstances. Or, it can also exist external to the agent (S), manifested perhaps as another agent or as the result of a law of nature, such as wind or gravity.
As Chapman (1987) discovered in the domain of planning however, the omniscient method of representation described so far becomes combinatorially intractable in a fast-changing, complex world. Mandating that the agent must apprehend and internally maintain a complete, omniscient copy of the world, including causal relations among properties, presumably on a constant and real-time basis, is unrealistic and unsound. This entire discussion relating to omniscience, causality and the frame problem will be resumed in Section 3.
Human cognition without omniscience
In biological agents such as humans, the set of internal mental representations corresponding to the potentially infinite set of external objects and events is considerably smaller than the exhaustive, omniscient case presented a moment ago. The reason why this must be so is because true biological agents are not omniscient. The biological agent's perceptual and attentional faculties only permit a constrained apprehension of externally occurring information. Yet, biological agents intuitively "know" which properties of external objects to attend to and which ones to ignore. Biological reasoning agents do not have a frame problem. The attempt to capture this biological capability in a representation is a cyclic theme throughout many of the contributions in the book. Fig. 3 illustrates a non-omniscient scenario involving an infinite set of external objects {xc ,. . .,x,} and a finite set of internal representations {io,. ..,is}. In this case, the external-internal mapping is neither omniscient as described in the previous Section 1.2, nor are the mappings consistent from one state to the next. More precisely, in state n, there is no mapping between x3 and is, but there are mappings between {xo,io}, {xl,il} and {x&}. Yet, in state n + 1, (a) the mapping between {xc&} still exists, (b) the mappings between {xl,il } and {xs,iS} are absent, unlike state n, where they were present, and (c) the mapping between x3 and i3 is present, whereas in state n it was not. Also, in the case of xp, x4 and (x6,. . .,n,}, the Internal representations i2, i4 and {ie,. . .,i,} that could potentially map to these corresponding external objects do not even exist for any state.
Therefore, in this non-omniscient scenario, although in certain cases a mapping does not exist (e.g., {&,x3} in state n), the potential for a mapping always exists (e.g., {ij,,q} in state n + 1). This state of affairs is certainly more congruent with biological cognition. Consider the phenomenon of object recognition. In the presence of a prelearned stimulus, the mapping can be established through the faculties of attention and perception. But in absence of the stimulus, the potential for a mapping still exists. In the case where external objects exist but for which an internal representational placeholder does not (e.g., x2, x4), it might be the case that the external object will eventually be perceived, then through learning, an internal representation is established to correspond to this external object and any events (changes of property) associated with it and other internal representations.
It must be noted that the omniscience/non-omniscience issue so far discussed ultimately bears on the intra-agent case as well, in which two or more sets of internal states (e.g., #S, ##S) correspond to each other in a fashion identical to the "standard" external S, internal #S case. The reason for this is because once a particular representation is internalized, through learning, the agent also utilizes internal representations, in conjunction with or even in the absence of any external stimuli.
To summarize, standing in direct contrast with machine cognition and omniscience is the relative ease by which biological organisms appear to solve frame-like problems (e.g., Nutter). In the lives of biological organisms, there are many objects and events that occur in the world which the organism either is aware of yet ignores, or simply has no awareness of. In either case, even with incomplete and partial knowledge, the organism's ongoing perceptions, deliberations and actions typically meet with relative success. One of the main functions of evolution has been to ensure that, by attending to the more necessary and relevant things in the world, such as the acquisition of food and a mate, as well as the evasion of predators, there is a higher probability that ontogenetic, phylogenetic and, in the case of humans, sociocultural success will follow. In order to survive, a successful biological reasoning agent must know what to attend to and what to ignore in a wide variety of situations. This phenomenon can be observed in the simplest of insects to the most complex of mammals. Moreover, with humans, this capability appears to have extended far beyond the basic survival requirements of evolution and has resulted in reasoning processes which transcend a wide variety of domains including language and problem solving. Some of these types of reasoning will be covered in more detail in the survey of Nutter's and Perlis' chapters.
In the quest for artificial intelligence then, if biological organisms can appropriately attend and ignore with such effortlessness, why has it been so difficult, if not impossible, for the AI researcher to replicate the same phenomenon in a non-biological medium such as a computer or a robot? In particular, biological entities are able to function without omniscience, and appear to solve frame-like problems (Nutter). As the progenitors of the frame problem have argued, being able to successfully represent this ability is the challenge of the frame problem-appropriately attending to or ignoring the presence and absence of change and non-change in a dynamic world:
One feels that there should be some economical and principled way of succinctly saying what changes an action makes, without having to explicitly list all the things it doesn't change as well; yet there doesn't seem to be any other way to do it. That is the frame problem. (Hayes, 1987, p. 125) [original emphasis]
A dynamic world
Complementing the issue of omniscience, there is also the title of the book to be considered, Reasoning Agents in a Dynamic World, and how it applies to the various contributions in the book. I assume "dynamic" refers to a world which changes constantly, is unpredictable, and happens in a real-time fashion. To put it another way, the granularity of the dynamic world should correspond to the least noticeable change detectable by the reasoning agent. For a rapidly changing world, the metrics might involve distances of centimeters or meters and time intervals of milliseconds.
For a slowly changing world, perhaps millimeters and minutes. Finally, I interpret reasoning agent to mean either a biological organism, such as a human, or a non-biological entity resembling a computer or a robot. With basic ideas, terms and goals intact, I now turn to the book.
Survey of the book
The book is not organized into sections. The fifteen chapters are presented alphabetically according to the first author's last name. I have separated eleven of these contributions into five general topics which are organized in this section into the following subsections: 2.1, Object-based models (Nutter, Sandewall) ; 2.2, Philosophical approaches (Perlis); 2.3, Persistence (Goodwin & Trudel, Haugh, Weber) ; 2.4, The qualification problem and circumscription (Etherington et al., Tenenberg, Weld) ; and 2.5, Modal and temporal logics (Stein, Morgenstern) .
In each of these subsections for each chapter that I survey, I have used the actual title of the chapter in the book as the opening paragraph header. Using this format, the reader of this review has the option to read only those subsections that might be of interest. I would like to point out though that central to my discussion later in Section 3 will be the contributions of Nutter, Perlis and Stein and, to a lesser extent, Etherington et al., Goodwin & Trudel, Haugh and Weber. 2.1. Object-based models
Focus of Attention, Context and the Frame Problem
J. Terry Nutter (pp. 171-188) has three main points: (1) there is a class offrame-like problems across AI that share features with the frame problem, (2) there is a single, potentially sufficient mechanism to deal with these frame-like problems involving the focus of attention, and (3) the underpinnings of this mechanism are a rich notion of context and an understanding of salience. She supports McDermott's (1987) claim that the frame problem is unsolvable by people and that one should not worry about trying to get machines such as robots to solve problems that humans cannot. Rather, it is postulated that people do things that look like they are solving the frame problem.
Hence, Nutter asserts that the solutions we do come up with should be generalizable, not specific to one domain such as the Yale shooting problem (introduced in Section 2.3 below). Unsolvable problems should be avoided, and we should try to find the most economic and interesting solutions. Nutter emphasizes the fact that since the specification of the representational aspect of the original frame problem is narrow (i.e., the narrow/broad distinction) relating to the qualification, ramification and persistence problems, the solutions will be narrow as well. Instead of narrow solutions, she suggests that we look in suitable areas to find broader, generalizable solutions. Hence, Nutter's conception of the frame problem is the problem of too much knowledge. Her central conjecture is, "every time we appear to solve a general problem of change and relevance, what we have actually done is replaced it by a much simpler problem, and solved that" (p. 176). In turn, it is claimed that people solve frame-like problems iteratively, by adopting a simplification of a problem, considering the solution, then using information about the failure of the solution (if it fails) to adjust the simplification and try again. She cites three exemplary frame-like problems: natural language understanding, which implications to attend to and which to ignore; learning, which features to try to project to the new model being learned and which ones to ignore; and analogical reasoning, which features to project between analogies and which ones to ignore. The practice of these three domains all share the process of limitation. According to Nutter, the key mechanism to realize context and salience is the focus of attention. She asserts that intuition is contentdriven. Frame-like reasoning can be realized by using content to restrict content through impoverishment of a working model of the world, and by attending only to salient, relevant features through this focus of attention.
Nutter sketches a proposed implementation of her attention model as a propositional semantic network. The structure of the network entails an exhaustive static world model that, by default, is inactive. The nodes are activated (made salient) via a metaphorical "gas" that spreads through the network. The spreading activation of the "gas" in localized regions in the network corresponds to the focus of attention. The flow of the gas can be attenuated either by fixing the quantity of gas or by limiting the number of edges from the activated area through which the gas can spread.
Towards a logic of dynamic frames
Erik Sandewall's thesis (pp. 201-217) entails combining McCarthy & Hayes' (1969) and Minsky's (1975) concepts of "frame" along with Hayes' (1985) histories. It is argued that the McCarthy & Hayes frame and the Minsky frame differ only on the principle of methodology; the former being a predicate logic-based approach, the latter being presented as an alternative to predicate logic realized instead as an object-based formalism (e.g., Stefik & Bobrow, 1986) . Likewise, a history is "a piece of spacetime with natural boundaries, both temporal and spatial" (Hayes, 1985) . Sandewall sees a relationship between Minsky frames and histories because they both are an attempt to assign a structure to the modeling of the world.
Sandewall coins the term dynamic frame to describe his proposed structure. He describes the application of designing an electronic automobile co-driver as a suitable domain for dynamic frames. The co-driver is intended to be a control system for maneuvering a motor vehicle in real world traffic environments. The knowledge base for the co-driver is called the model of the current traffic situation (MCTS). A simple instance of the MCTS consists of frames which contain information about the cars in front and cars behind the vehicle being controlled. The dynamic aspect of the frame entails the quantitative change of parameters such as distances and velocities which are maintained as individual parameter values (i.e., fluents) in the frames. Sandewall introduces two dynamic frame management concepts: intra-frame change, the smooth change and discontinuities in parameter values, and inter-frame change, managing the structure of frames including creation, destruction and modification. He denotes two types of inter-frame change: actuated change caused by an agent (e.g., driver of the vehicle), and mechanical change caused by the physical world. His goal is to characterize, in logic, dynamic frames and the histories they describe. The requirements for this proposed logic are to ( 1) write differential control equations as axioms, and (2) characterize inter-frame change as well as decide which control axioms hold under which conditions. Although he says, "no such logic exists today" (p. 211), Sandewall turns to Forbus' ( 1985) Qualitative Process Theory (QPT) for some clues to a potential ontology of such a logic. He touches on three components from QPT: processes which create, terminate and influence objects-similar to his inter-frame change; physical objects which closely resemble his dynamic frames; and injuences, those things that affect parameter values-synonymous with his intra-frame change. I provide a simple analogy which captures the essence of dynamic frames. The phase changes of water are discontinuous at 0 and 100 degrees Celsius. This motivates the requirement for the creation and management of three dynamic frames to represent the three unique states of water; solid, liquid and gas. With such a representation Sandewall's logic-frame hybrid would mediate the intra-frame aspects of each state such as volume and temperature, obtained from physical sensors. It would also control the inter-frame transition from one state, or frame, to another as the temperature of the medium rises or falls.
Philosophical approaches

Intentional@ and Defaults
Donald Perlis (pp. 189-199) provides a philosophical and theoretical discussion describing his theory of intentionality. Intentionality is the notion of aboutness, e.g., the word "cat" is about a living organism with fur and four legs that makes a meowing sound. Perlis' account involves a cycle of postulating an error about a belief, detecting the error and correcting the erroneous belief. It is assumed that a reasoning agent must be able to distinguish between error and truth. This approach addresses an extended realm of default reasoning comprising a complex world in which a reasoning agent will always make mistakes and is compelled to correct these mistakes in order to survive.
Perlis' definition of the frame problem is that it is an aspect of the problem of default reasoning and there are two types: the numerical and conceptual. The numerical frame problem entails a precisely-defined world in which most entities possess the property of inertia, many axioms are required for description, nothing is uncertain and default reasoning is not required (i.e., blocks-world). The conceptual frame problem relates to a world of uncertainty. This is a world that is too complex to fully axiomatize in which only rules of thumb can be used and described with imprecise and vague concepts. Default reasoning was born out of uncertainty (Reiter, 1980; Lifschitz, 1987; Haugh, 1987) . The problem, according to Perlis, is that standard approaches to default reasoning have focused on capturing defaults in the domain, but not on what to do with something that comes along and defeats a default-the solution has been to throw away the defeated default and retain the defeater.
Presented as the Appearance Reality Distinction (ARD), Perlis defines appearance to be those things that are maintained internally (machine or mind) as conceptual or mental entities. Likewise, reality corresponds to the "real" things occurring in the world external to the reasoning agent. Reasoners are forced by circumstances to distinguish between Thomason, 1992) appearance and reality. In the case where appearance and reality are not congruent, error results. Standard default reasoning and frame problem notions of inertia do not find conclusions about error. Hence, what ARD does is to build error into its framework. Perlis enumerates several examples where the strength of this approach is applied to different modes of reasoning. These include: (a) in the absence of enough information, such as in the Nixon Diamond, 3 either leaving the problem unresolved or seeking more data to resolve it, (b) having to remember past thinking in order to accomplish a current task, (c) remembering a past false belief during a course of reasoning, (d) remembering a past course of reasoning, and (e) separating goals from the current state of progress.
The last two sections discuss topics of past philosophical approaches to linking internal mental states to external physical entities. These include the word-world connection in Mill's direct reference theory ( 1875), the idea that words relate to things out in the world. Perlis also discusses Frege's ( 1960) and Russell's ( 1964) notions of reference meaning (i.e., word-world) and sense meaning, using different words to relate to or describe the same entity; e.g., the phrases "Silver Fox's husband" and "Former President of the U.S." share the same reference meaning, George Bush, but different sense meaning. Kripke ( 1980) and Putnam ( 1988) , in turn, derived a causal theory in order to describe another kind of sense meaning that describes the traditional notion of sense meaning. For example, what would be a consistent sense meaning for the phrase "top dog"? The argument surrounding the causal theory is that one does not necessarily have to know the detailed origins of "top dog", an aspect of hierarchical behavior in canine social life, in order to purposefully use such a phrase.
To provide an illustrative example of the merits of the ARD, Perlis finishes his discussion with a section describing Dennett's 2-bitser, a vending machine that accepts quarters. The gist of the 2-bitser is that the machine can only "mean" a quarter by virtue of an outside observer. Its intentionality is derived, not intrinsic. Perlis argues that the ARD is a step towards intrinsic or directed intentionality. By arguing that the 2-bitser machine can be fooled with bogus quarters, the error detection feature of the ARD comes to the rescue. With a quarter-verification feature built in, the 2-bitser could ' Richard Nixon is both a Republican and a Quaker. Republicans are not pacifists, yet Quakers are. Since Nixon inherits attributes from both, this results in a contradiction. The directed graph used to describe these four relationships assumes the shape of a diamond (Fig. 4) .
then be able to detect the fallacious coins via a specialized camera and reject them. The principal question he asks is, how do humans develop the same capacity to recognize the fact that they are wrong? He cites Kripke (1980) and Devitt & Sterlny (1987) as providing the most recent and robust answers to this puzzling question. Their answer lies in the cultivation of causal features with respect to the growth and usage offeatures of prototypical things from the perspective of the language user (i.e., reasoning agent).
Persistence Omniscience Isn't Needed to Solve the Frame Problem
Brian A. Haugh (pp. 105-13 1) challenges the presumptions of omniscience which surround extant technical solutions to the frame problem. He focuses on the omniscience relating to temporal persistence, the assumption that facts hold over time unless there is a specific reason to doubt the truth of those facts. Historically, this concept has been the principal alternative to frame axioms and has provided an elegant basis for certain solutions to the frame problem such as the add and delete lists in STRIPS (Fikes & Nilsson, 1971 ). In the STRIPS planning system, current, true facts about the world were maintained on the add list. Whenever a fact about the world was rendered invalid it was moved from the add list to the delete list. The popular term for this process of defeating or negating a persistent fact is known as "clipping".
Haugh enumerates six existing approaches to persistence and demonstrates how the omniscient assumptions within each detract from what appeals to common-sense reasoning:
l All successful actions known. This is associated with the concept of chronologically minimized clipping (Kautz, 1986; Lifschitz, 1986) , where more distant events are preferred to be clipped over more recent ones. In other words, facts about the world fade, become false or irrelevant, over time. The omniscient assumption inherent in chronological minimization is that all successful action-attempts are known for both recent and distant events.
l All fact changes known (Kautz, 1986; Lifschitz, 1986) . A reasoning agent has no means by which all changes in the world could be known. Therefore, this does not appeal to common sense since we ignore so many things that change during the course of reasoning.
l All event occurrences known. The motivated action theory of Morgenstern & Stein (1988) presumes that events are "motivated" by the situation or are provable in the situation. In the Yale shooting problem (Hanks & McDermott, 1986) 4 it is assumed by the omniscience of this theory that there are no other motivated events outside the scope of the axioms describing the problem that lead to an accidental unloading of the gun. 
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All intervening events known. In the McCarthy & Hayes situation calculus a state s nil results from an action A, in state S,,. The omniscient assumption is that no other events can occur between S,, and S,,+t . However, there are many events that occur between states that we have no knowledge of. All causal laws are known. Other than action, the other principal means of change are physical laws or rules that describe what changes are the result of events in given circumstances (Hayes, 1971; Lifschitz, 1987; Morgenstern & Stein, 1988) . In most formalisms, it is almost always the case that all laws must explicitly be known. This assumption is unrealistic in the face of what appeals to common sense. Sole suspects are culprits. Challenging Baker (1989) , Baker & Ginsberg ( 1989) , Lifschitz ( 1987) and Morgenstern & Stein ( 1988) , "the actual cause of some change (culprit) is amongst the known potential causes of such a change (the suspects) whenever there are such suspects" (p. 113). Again, this assumption can only work in a context-free world in which all cause-effect relationships are known. In the face of all this omniscience, Haugh presents his theory of unpresumptuous temporal persistence which entails four components: avoiding unjustified changes, distinguishing explicit knowledge, minimizing unexplained changes and minimizing unjustified changes. This is accomplished by providing a means to distinguish as well as describe explicit and derived facts. The derived facts in particular, Haugh states, will, in the long run, have to be of an autoepistemic nature. What this means is that knowledge derived from the environment and internalized by the reasoning agent must be integrated with existing knowledge in order to form new knowledge.
The Myth of Domain-Independent
Persistence Jay C. argues that, "solving the frame problem reduces to the problem of inferring the nonexistence of causes for change" (p. 259). He addresses action occurrence omniscience, i.e., knowledge of all actions, and argues the reason that certain solutions to the frame problem are not generalizable is because of their inherent domain-independence.
Weber shows how the minimization of action occurrences may not necessarily lead to intuitively consistent solutions to problems. Domain knowledge is required to provide contextual information that is not possible in a domain-independent paradigm. He shows that this can be accomplished in three different causal theories involving the use of deductive, nonmonotonic' and statistical domain details. Weber illustrates his idea of deductive domain details by introducing six additional domain-dependent axioms to the original Yale shooting problem. For example he suggests adding the axiom, "Gunman waits briefly, without unloading or shooting the gun" to the original problem. This axiom eliminates the need for earlier explanations such as motivated action theory (Morgenstern & Stein, 1988) where the continuous loaded state of the gun and subsequent death of Fred is explained by the absence of a third agent who could come along and unload the gun.
With nonmonotonic domain details Weber extrapolates that the qualification problem is also applicable to the notion of requiring the preconditions for luck of change. For example, if an agent parks her car, then goes to work, she should expect her car to be there at the end of the day (Allen, 1984) . There are certain things that could happen to the car, such as being stolen or impounded; but the assumption that the car will probably be there at the end of the day is a reasonable one. Hence, Weber suggests the introduction of domain-dependent assumptions written in the style of Reiter's ( 1980) default rules. 6 Thus, regarding the car scenario:
. . . it seems reasonable at first, to assume that my car is still where I left it this morning, unless I have information that is inconsistent with that assumption. However, this premise gets less and less reasonable [emphasis added] as hours turn into days, weeks, months, years and centuries-even if it is quite consistent to make such a premise. This puts the problem where it should benamely in the area of making reasonable assumptions, not in the area of defining the effects of actions . . ., the persistence of facts . . ., or causal laws . . . . (Georgeff, 1987, pp. 118-l 19) This passage sets the stage for Weber's final topic, the notion of statistical domain details, which is a hybrid of statistics and nonmonotonic logic. The principal goal is to "assign numerical beliefs to assertions about the persistence of properties" (p. 269). The heart of this approach is to find the means to express the idea of less and less reasonable in the quote above. Using the statistical inference of Kyburg (1974) the basic statistical persistence inference form is:
This has a Bayesian flavor and reads, "X is the belief that p is true immediately after t' given that p is true at t". In the car example, the persistent belief that "the car almost always stays in the parking lot" would be expressed as: %t(true(inLot, t') ) true(inLot, t)) M 1.
Persistence in Continuous First Order Temporal Logics
Scott D. point out that much work has been done in both discrete temporal logics such as the situation calculus (Kautz, 1986; Shoham, 1986; Goebel & Goodwin, 1987; Haugh, 1987; Lifschitz, 1987; Loui, 1987; Goodwin & Goebel, 1989 ) and continuous first-order temporal logics (McDermott, 1982; Allen, 1984; Shoham, 1988) ; but the study of persistence in the latter case has received little attention. It is asserted that the requirements for a continuous temporal logic are (1) point-based information that is true or false at a point in time and (2) interval-bused information that is true or false over an interval of time (i.e., between two points in time). Ontologically, intervals subsume points; but points do not subsume intervals. The gist of their work involves a persistence rule in which (1) point-based 6Theserulesareoftheform
[P*~~z;J)] which means that if p is true in situation s and p is still consistent after the action a then we can infer p after the action.
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information persists by default until defeated and (2) the persistence of interval-based information is determined by the persistence of point-based information, This is accomplished by combining a temporal logic, GCH, with a statistically motivated semantics for defaults called Extended Theorist (Goodwin & Goebel, 1989) derived from Poole's (1987) Theorist. This type of default differs from the standard notion of the default, i.e., "assume true in the absence of evidence to the contrary" (e.g., Reiter, 1980) . Instead the authors "interpret defaults as asserting statistical knowledge which can be used to justify particular beliefs" (p. 94). Using the Yale shooting problem as a sample domain, the authors re-axiomatize the problem so that it is continuous rather than discrete. The continuous temporal domain knowledge is represented as facts and defaults. The Yale shooting problem from Hanks & McDermott (1986) results in two extensions.7
The authors translate these two extensions from discrete form into their continuous representation.
What follows is the syntax that describes these continuous versions, then text which explains the syntax and semantics:
Tn, which reads "extension a", states that the gun is loaded from time 1 up to and including time 2, denoted by "I", and Fred is alive from time 0 up to but not including time 3, denoted by ")". l-b reads that the gun is loaded from time 1 up to but not including time 2 and that Fred is alive from time 0 up to and including time 3. These are illustrated in Fig. 5 . In the scenario the gun is fired sometime during the interval [ 2,3] (including time 2 and time 3). The question is asked as to whether Fred is alive or dead at time 3. There are at least three ways to evaluate these two extensions. I enumerate these in detail here since they comprise a principal subset of several methods to evaluate problems such as the Yale shooting problem.
The first way is to evaluate them according to the standard facts and deductions strictly associated with the axiomatization of the problem. In T(, it is not explicitly known if Fred is alive or dead at time 3. But since the gun is loaded from time 1 to time 2 and the gun is fired somewhere between time 2 and time 3, we can infer at time 3 that Fred is dead through the domain axiom, "IF someone fires a loaded gun at a living person THEN the person will die". In rh, since it is stated Fred is alive at time 3, it can be deduced that the gun was unloaded at time 2. This is the original interpretation of the problem; and it cannot be determined whether Fred is alive or dead at time 3, since both extensions possess reasonable, yet contradictory, interpretations.
rLl suggests that Fred is dead and rh says that Fred is alive.
The second way is to evaluate the extensions r, and rb according to the exceptions F,, and &h respectively. Exceptions are meta-level inferences made by the researcher that ' An extension is one of several outcomes in a nonmonotonic logic in which a contradiction has occurred. In the Nixon Diamond for example. one extension maintains that Nixon is {Republican, Quaker, Pacifist}; and a second extension holds that Nixon is {Republican, Quaker, TPacifist} Note that {Republican, Quaker, Pacifist, YPacifist} is not a legal extension since Nixon cannot be both a pacifist and a non-pacifist. are not a result of the original axiomatization of the problem. Exceptions can either be discountable (refutable) and do not affect the validity of an extension or nondiscountable (irrefutable) and invalidate an extension. E, is an exception to r, since it is not known if Fred is alive at time 3. If Fred is alive at time 3, this fact would invalidate the truth of the assumption, persists( [ 1,2] Joaded). ~6 is an exception to rb since it is not known if the gun is unloaded at time 2. If the gun is loaded at time 2, this fact would invalidate the truth of the assumption, persists( [ 0,3] ,alive) . Both E* and &b are nondiscountable; and, as a result, both extensions r, and rb cannot be considered as reasonable outcomes to the scenario.
Finally, the third way involves the authors' notion of temporal independence (Goodwin & Goebel, 1989) , which means that the state of affairs at any point in time depends only on the states of affairs at past points in time. Conversely, past states of affairs are fixed, independent and unaffected by the future. In this context .sa, is now a discountable exception to r, since the gun was loaded in the past and the truth of this assumption cannot be dependent on the fact that Fred is alive or dead in the future. Given temporal independence, since the gun was loaded, then fired, Fred is dead. However, et, is still a nondiscountable exception to rb, since the truth of the gun being unloaded at time 2 depends on Fred being alive in the future, which he is not, thus violating temporal independence. Given this outcome, Fred dies.
The qualijcation problem and circumscription
Limited scope and circumscriptive reasoning
David Etherington, Sarit Kraus and Donald Perlis (pp. 43-54) claim "a proper foundation for the frame problem must rest on a theory of non-monotonic reasoning [ (NMR) I" (p. 43). They argue, however, that extant forms of NMR tend to be overeager to jump to default assumptions. 'The problem is that agents frequently know that there must be individuals who do not have the default properties, without knowing who those individuals are" (p. 46).
In particular, McCarthy's (1980 McCarthy's ( , 1986 circumscription approach was a proposed solution to the qualification problem; i.e., how many preconditions must be satisfied before we know a particular action can happen? Circumscription implements an inference rule for deriving sets of assumptions on the basis of available information. For example, J.A. Totlz/Art@icial Intelligence 73 (1995) 323-369 suppose we know only one red-haired person, Jane. If we see someone who has red hair, by circumscription we assume it is Jane. However, if we learn that Jane has an identical twin Joan, we can no longer assume by circumscription that it is Jane; the best we can do is to assume that it is either Jane or Joan (Cohen & Feigenbaum, 1989, pp. 118-I 19) .
Hence, what is required is the additional capability of scope in the NMR system. The term "scope" in this context means something of concern, or relevant to making a decision (p. 47). It is suggested that there are two kinds of scope; wide (e.g., all redhaired people) and narrow (e.g., Jane). If the scope is narrow, it is safe to reason with a default conclusion. But if the scope is wide, default conclusions cannot be trusted. The authors provide another illustration. There is an engineer who routinely inspects hundreds of bridges a year. Although safe bridges tend to remain safe, every year she fully expects to find several that are unsafe. Thus, during the year she does not make the default assumption that any given bridge is safe-within the wide scope of her professional concern, there are exceptions to the safety default and it is her job to find them. Likewise, when she is away on vacation and happens upon an unfamiliar bridge that she would have not inspected, in her narrow scope of interest she would have no reason to believe that the bridge is unsafe and crosses it without reserve. A system of logic is advanced by the authors to capture this idea of scope in circumscriptive reasoning.
Abandoning the completeness assumptions
Josh D. Tenenberg (pp. 23 I-257) challenges extant approaches that require complete knowledge of the world (i.e., omniscience).
He strikes theoretical ground somewhere between two prevailing views he refers to as the permissive and conservative approaches. The permissive approach comprises the frame axiom, procedural and nonmonotonic approaches that assume the agent precipitates change, knows of all action in the world and is aware of all causal relationships between an action and its effects. Historically, this has been described as:
conditions P do not change when action A occurs The conservative approach entails explanation closure (Schubert, 1989; Weber, 1989; Haas, 1987) and multiple agency and concurrency (Allen, 1984; Pollack, 1985; McDermott, 1982; Georgeff, 1987) . Explanation closure is phrased as:
condition P changes between time T and T + I, only when one of actions Al , . . . , A,, occurs at time T ( p. 240).
Multiple agency and concurrency address the issue of outside actions overlooked by explanation closure but still assume that the agent is aware of all events in the world (i.e., omniscience).
Tenenberg suggests, as an alternative, that "actions achieve goals relative to a context with some likelihood of success" (p. 232). Like Weber, Tenenberg implements Kyburgian statistics and attacks the qualification problem by arguing that most qualifications defeat the success of certain actions only a fraction of the time. Exemplifying the Yale Shooting Problem, he argues that all treatments of the problem to date have predicted Fred's death. Schubert (1989) and Weber (1989) have shown that the gun can only be unloaded by unload axioms, which do not exist in the original problem. Kautz (1986) and Shoham (1986) suggest that all propositions, unless defeated, must persist right up until Fnxl's death. Lifschitz (1987) , Haugh (1987) and Weber (1988) have also shown that, by minimizing causative acts, there is no way the gun can become unloaded. Tenenberg, suggests however, that these approaches, although sound, can become strained when the waiting period, for example, becomes increasingly longer. Tenenberg has developed inference statistics such as,
which reads, "given a person is initially alive and has been shot at with a loaded gun, the probability that s/he is now alive is somewhere between the interval 0.1 and 0.3". Tenenberg strikes the middle ground as "an approach that associates statistically bounded probabilities with temporally scoped assertions" (p. 254).
System dynamics and the qualtjication problem
Daniel S. Weld (pp. 275-286) sees the qualification problem as part of a larger problem where "every model of reality is an approximation" and "the qualifications of an action are violated when the model's simplifying assumptions are inappropriate" (p. 275). He introduces a three-phase approach to managing the qualification problem by ( 1) choosing a model, (2) reasoning within the model, and (3) validating that the choice of model is appropriate-if the choice fails, compare models and switch to a different model. Weld points out that according to the Heisenberg uncertainty principle-as certain quantities are measured more precisely the ability to determine others is lost-it has been shown that perfect deterministic models are theoretically impossible. Even if a perfect model of the world were to exist, the only way to manage tractability within a system would be by the introduction of simplifying assumptions. Engaging McCarthy's potato-in-the-tailpipe scenario, * Weld discusses the advantages of inter-model over intra-model qualifications by asking the question; what happens if the key is turned with a potato in the tailpipe? These types of dynamics belong to models outside of the realm of just starting a car-unless one insists on including the behavior of potatoes in the ontology of a car.
Weld has developed a domain-independent algorithm for discrepancy-driven model switching that uses a method of generate and test. Implemented as a Lisp system, SAM, the algorithm is given a Graph of Models (GoM) which entails a directed graph where the nodes are models and the edges comprise sets of simplifying assumptions that distinguish between adjacent models. The current deficit of SAM is that it is dependent on continuous representations such as those involving physics mechanics problems. Also, unless explicitly specified, the algorithm does not know how to deal with unknown discrepancies; in these cases, Weld suggests that an approach involving theory formation would be an appropriate direction of research. Stein remarks that the problem with solving counterfactuals involves the ability to determine what facts about the world are relevant to the change being made in the world or to the agent vis-a-vis the antecedent of the counterfactual. In the case of the dining room table, the basic question is, what else is relevant to the movement of the table; e.g., is the color of the table really relevant simply because it has been moved from one room to another? Citing Ginsberg ( 1986)) Ginsberg ( 1987a) , Ginsberg & Smith ( 1988a , 1988b and Lewis (1973) , Stein maintains that any instance of the frame problem can be restated in terms of a counterfactual validity problem. This is accomplished through a possible worlds approach in which the reasoner must determine the closeness between the current world (e.g., dining room) and other worlds (e.g., living room) including any action and its results. This also involves the principle of truth maintenance such that transitions between worlds result in consistent facts. For example, by moving the table from the dining room to the living room, in a new world, the table can obviously not be in two different places. In a new living room world, the fact about the table being in the dining room must be retracted.
The counterfactual validity problem is concerned with the differences between this world and [a world] in which I move the table, while the frame problem is concerned with the effects (and non-effects) of moving the Stein also summarizes some basic differences between the frame problem and the counterfactual validity problem. In the frame problem, change is over time and causes are directly related to their effects. Also, in the context of the qualification and ramification problems, the frame problem is constrained whereas counterfactuals are not-any antecedent or side-effect of a counterfactual must be acceptable, no matter how farfetched.
Knowledge and the frame problem
Leora Morgenstern (pp. 133-170) discusses the integration of a theory of action with a theory of knowledge that allows for multiple agents. She refers to these as the third agent and vicarious planning frame problems. The former happens when a planning agent, depending on another person, does not know if that person will know enough to participate in the plan when it comes time to perform his part in the plan. The latter occurs when a planning agent delegates a part of the plan to another person and is uncertain as to what the state of the world will be once the delegate is finished. An example of the third agent frame problem:
Bill wants to open a safe at time I. To open the safe, he needs to know the combination of the safe. He does not know the combination, but knows that his friend Susan knows a friend of his (the third agent) who does. Assume that friendly agents cooperate and give information when requested to do so. To further simplify the problem, assume that in this particular problem situation, concurrent actions are not allowed. How can Bill plan to open the safe?
If the above example is modified so that the person who knows the combination is Susan's friend, rather than Bill's, we then have an instance of the vicarious planning frame problem. For the third agent problem, intuition says that Bill should plan to (a) ask Susan for the name of his friend (i.e., the third agent), (b) Susan tells Bill the name of his friend, (c) Bill asks his friend for the combination, and (d) Bill's friend tells him the combination.
Unfortunately, Bill cannot prove that his plan will work because he cannot prove that his friend will know the combination at a later time such as time 3. The reason why this is so is because neither Bill, his friend, nor Susan know of all the actions that transpire between times 1 and 3-even if the activities of all three agents transpire in a synchronized fashion, without concurrency. The "frame" aspects of both of these problems entail knowing what stays the same about the world when portions of the plan are delegated to other agents.
Morgenstern asserts that standard frame problem solutions such as frame axioms and nonmonotonic temporal logics (McDermott, 1982; McCarthy, 1986) do not work for multi-agency because they were designed with single-agency in mind. Two omniscient properties of those approaches are highlighted; dense, the system knows of something that occurs at any point in time-there are no gaps in knowledge; and complete, all actions are known to the system. Concepts such as concurrent actions and incomplete knowledge about actions and the world are not expressible in extant paradigms. Thus, Morgenstern's chief requirements are ( 1) "to develop a non-monotonic temporal logic that allows an agent, if he does not know of a particular action, to conclude that the action has not taken place" (p. 148), (2) the reasoning system should prefer situations " in which actions happen only if they are motivated . . ." (p. 148), and (3) to s&port both forward and backward reasoning. The Motivated Action Theory (MAT) of Morgenstern & Stein ( 1988) accommodates these requirements. The gist of the theory is that an action is motivated if there is a reason for it to happen. In forward temporal projection, applied to the original Yale shooting problem, MAT will predict Fred's death. In turn, if told that Fred is alive after the gun has been fired, MAT will reason via backward temporal projection and conclude that the gun must have been unloaded. In general, MAT prefers logical conclusions in which the&vest unmotivated actions take place, ". . . based on the principle that an agent typically knows all that he needs to know in order to make predictions about the world in which he lives" (p. 149).
Based on the above requirements, she introduces EMAT, which is the integration of MAT, a theory of action and planning, with an epistemic (i.e., related to knowledge) logic. EMAT essentially allows "reasoning agents to reason about how other agents perform temporal reasoning" (p. 1.57). Some of the basic features of EMAT include, ( 1) a "weak" epistemic operator believe that allows the nonmonotonic reasoning system to construct plans around knowledge that may or may not be true, (2) a theory of relativized instantiation i.e., all the propositions an agent a believes at time I, and (3) the capability of nesting multi-agent beliefs (e.g., Bill knows that Susan knows that a friend-of-Bill's knows the combination).
Discussion
Although various authors cannot seem to agree on what the fundamental problem or solution is, there certainly appears to be a special phenomenon or human capability that workers are trying to capture in these bodies of theories.'
Humans and other biological organisms are very skilled at what appears to be the effortless discernment between change and the absence of change and the adeptness to suitably attend to either under a wide variety of circumstances.
Along with the term frame problem, aspects of this phenomenon are also referred to in the book as scope (Etherington et al.), salience, context, intuition (Nutter) , common sense (e.g., Haugh), relevance (Stein), meaning, sense and reference (Perlis), among others. No matter what it might be called, the issue from the perspective of human or machine cognition remains-precisely how does one go about representing these phenomena while avoiding the perplexing singularity known as the frame problem? In the absence of a consensus as to what the frame problem or solution is, when considering each approach in the book, and for the purposes of the ensuing discussion, I suggest that the reader default to the traditional McCarthy & Hayes ( 1969) narrow frame problem. For any representation, there exists a set of assumptions that are driven by a scientific perspective within which that representation is developed. In this section, my goal is to discuss the issue of 9 There are three earlier volumes dedicated to the frame problem and related problems (Brown, 1987; Ginsberg, 1987b; Pylyshyn, 1987) . The editors also mention another book under development edited by Kenneth Ford and Zenon Pylyshyn titled, The Robot's Dilemma Revisited: The Frame Problem in Artijcial Intelligence (Ablex Press) which has arisen from the same body of Workshop papers that inspired this book.
representation in the context of scientific methodology. Most central to this issue is how the researcher in AI or cognitive science chooses to look at the phenomenon involving the intelligent agent and its environment. Depending on how the researcher chooses to view such phenomena invariably affects the mode of abstraction which then results in a representation. From certain methods stem the assumption of omniscience and the frame problem.
I. Abstraction and representation
I would like to revisit the assumption of omniscience explicated in Sections 1.2, 1.3 and Figs. l-3. To summarize, omniscience is the unattainable ideal which propounds that the reasoning agent must be completely aware of all objects and events external and internal to it. The representations in most extant AI architectures and cognitive models depend on the assumption of omniscience as part of their ontology and epistemology. The same representations however, typically involving structures and processes, ultimately depend on a general method, or mode, of abstraction. In turn, the mode of abstraction depends on a particular scientific point of view through which the researcher has decided to study a phenomenon. The purpose of this discussion is to make apparent that the frame problem is a problem owing to particular scientific world views through which AI researchers or cognitive scientists (hereinafter, referred to as researcher) have attempted to abstract and represent the relationship between reasoning agents and the dynamic worlds in which they exist.
Unlike McDermott, however, I don't think the frame problem is unreal or insignificant: It seems to point up a basic error in the way we try to describe the everyday world. We aren't carving nature up at the right ontological joints, if you ask me. But time will tell. (Hayes, 1987, p. 130) This passage by Hayes occurred in a time during which the legitimacy of the frame problem had been brought into serious question. McDermott, in the same volume, argued that no known AI researcher was working on the frame problem. McDermott also maintained that the frame problem was, "of interest mainly to a fringe group, those who believe that logical analyses are relevant to building knowledge representations. I count myself in this group. . ." (1987, p. 116 ). Yet, in the passage above, it is clear that Hayes is calling into account matters regarding the philosophy of science and scientific methodology. He suggests that methodology plays a role in how the researcher chooses to approach a given problem in AI or cognitive science, which then results in a representation. In certain cases, the desired approach leads to an obstacle known as the frame problem. Following Hayes' cue then, I wish to further his line of reasoning and explore what other means might exist that would allow the researcher to "carve nature up" at a different set of "ontological joints". Pepper ( 1942 Pepper ( , 1967 , Dewey and Bentley ( 1949) , Altman & Rogoff ( 1987) and Wertsch ( 1991) are among a few who have brought into perspective particular scientific world views which reflect how the researcher defines relationships between (a) the reasoning agent, (b) the agent's environment, and (c) the observer of the agent and environment; whether the observer be the researcher, or, an observer that is an aspect
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Intelligence 73 (I 995) 323-369 of the phenomenon itself. The term "world view " is derived from the notion of world hypothesis. These terms collectively refer to the manner by which an observer of nature, usually a physical, natural or social scientist, chooses to characterize the phenomena that he or she witnesses. Although several different types of world views have been advanced, there are three in particular that I would like to highlight for the purposes of this discussion-the interactional, organismic, and transactional world views of Altman & Rogoff ( 1987) . Each of these world views possess six distinguishing attributes which render them distinct: (i) the units of analysis; the characterization of (ii) time, (iii) change, (iv) causation and (v) context; and (vi) the role of the observer. Below, I will describe each of these three world views and show how they are representative of various approaches to human and machine cognition. In the case of the interactional and organismic world views, omniscience and the frame problem exist. Yet, in the transactional world view, as will be illustrated later in Section 3.4, omniscience and the frame problem are entirely absent.
In addition, since the traditional narrow frame problem is a scientific problem of representation, I maintain that it is prudent to discuss such matters in terms of testable hypotheses. One means of validating a representational hypothesis is by way of mathematical proof. Unfortunately, a proof does not provide much insight into how the representation will actually perform, particularly in a dynamic, unpredictable world. Another effective way to test a specific hypothesis concerning a representation is to see how the representation actually performs in the actual or simulated environment it was originally abstracted from. This is usually accomplished by implementing the representation as an aggregation of data structures and algorithms in a computational system. Two parameters that are typically analyzed in this setting are space complexity, the amount of memory and secondary storage consumed by the data structures and algorithms, and time complex& the amount of computational (i.e., CPU) cycles consumed by the data structures and algorithms. From this perspective of space and time complexity, the contributions in the book have not yet been realized as intelligent computing systems that reason about dynamic worlds. lo Therefore, I will usher in two implemented, computational architectures, Tileworld and Pengi, which serve as very reasonable intelligent systems that (a) address many of the requirements idealized by the contributors in the book, and (b) also serve as exemplars for many of the underlying traits of the interactional (Tileworld) and transactional (Pengi) world views.
The interactional world view
The interactional world view is the prevailing method of scientific abstraction in both human and machine cognition.
Pepper's mechanistic perspective, Dewey and Bentley's interaction approach, and our interactional world view are similar in their common assumption that phenomena are composed of independent elements that interact according to "' In the book, Sandewall's dynamic frames are a candidate for a computational system which reasons about a dynamic world, but only appear to be in the phase of conceptual design. certain laws or principles. Although context and time can be included in these approaches, they are usually treated as independent domains, not as intrinsic parts of psychological phenomena. Thus space and time are "locations" of phenomena and are external to their functioning. (Altman & Rogoff, 1987, p. 10) 
[emphasis added]
Analysis of the intelligent phenomenon in the interactional world view involves the structured, sometimes recursive, decomposition of the agent and the environment into separable "atoms". These atoms are encapsulated and share direct cause-and-effect relationships with each other. Instances of this world view can be traced back to the philosophy of Aristotle and the physical laws of Newton. Atoms can be aggregated functionally and structurally into larger systems. The interactional world view has found wide appeal in the development of intelligent systems and cognitive models. This particular interactional world view of human and machine cognition is grounded in the sender-receiver communication theory of Shannon & Weaver ( 1949) and the computational models of Von Neumann (1961) and Turing (1946) , comingled with information processing theories of cognition beginning with Newell & Simon (1956) and Chomsky ( 1957 Chomsky ( , 1959 , among others. Fig. 6 highlights the basic constituents of this world view. The units of analysis typically comprise five atoms: (a) environment, or the input domain, (b) a stream of input bits which is transmitted from the environment to the agent, (c) the agent, which processes the input bits with internal processes and bits, i.e., aggregated, multiple recursive instances of this top-level model (e.g., see Fig. 7 ), (d) an output stream of bits, and (e) action, which affects the environment. Causation is of an antecedent (input), consequent (output) nature. Likewise, change, context and time, which involve internal and external objects and events, are treated as independent, disjunct entities. A principal feature of the interactional world view of human and machine cognition (hereinafter referred to as the cognitive world view) entails the law-like causul relationships that are exhaustively sustained between all atoms.
Two comparable examples of the interactional world view are behaviorism and certain forms of connectionism, for which the units of analysis are very similar to those of the cognitive world view. In the interactional world view of stimulus-response behaviorism, research efforts are principally focused on the environment (stimulus) and action (response) atoms. Behaviorism is unlike the cognitive world view, for in the cognitive world view the locus of study is instead on theoretical structures and processes internal to the agent atom, and to a lesser extent, the environment and action atoms. Likewise, in certain varieties of connectionism, the points of study at present appear to be primarily centered around the input and output bit stream atoms and the internal structures and processes of the agent atom. The connectionism interactional world view is quite similar to the cognitive interactional world view appearing to differ in two important ways; (a) the input bit stream atoms are presumably at the feature or sub-symbolic level, ii and (b) the structures and processes internal to the agent atom are continuous, rather than discrete and symbolic. Almost ironically, although these three exemplary disciplines are essentially of the same genre, the interactional world view, many contentious debates have transpired regarding which atoms should be the emphasis of study and what the ontology of those atoms should be (e.g., Chomsky, 1959; Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988) . In addition, recent disputes have broken out between world views regarding for instance, interpretations of a transactional world view, such as situated action (Agre, 1993) , from the perspective of the interactional, cognitive world view (Vera & Simon, 1993) .
The frame problem: is the interactional world view the culprit?
Omniscience and the frame problem emerge from the cognitive world view. During the 1950s the cognitive world view had arisen as a response to behaviorism and the strident emphasis on a stimulus-response account of intelligence. The then new cognitive researchers, as part of their anti-behaviorist insurrection, turned to the investigation of hypothetical structures and processes internal to the agent atom, by and large passing over the environment and action atoms. A fundamental problem has arisen from the cognitive world view, however, regarding how the internal structures and processes are typically represented. The problem stems from the immutable law intrinsic to the interactional world view which involves the causal or antecedent-consequent relationships sustained between atoms. In other words, any atom identified by the researcher, which is subsequently abstracted and realized in a representation, is affected by and affects all other atoms that have been abstracted into the same representation. By abstraction, I mean the process of mapping or translating the observable phenomenon into a form more suitable for analysis, representation or computation (see (Brooks, 199 1) , for an interesting account of abstraction in cognition). In the book, first-order logic is a preferred means of abstraction. Likewise, explicit causality is usually expressed either in terms of Modus Ponens (P --) Q), IF-THEN production rules, or inferential statistics (e.g., Tenenberg, Weber).
To provide a very simple, worst-case illustration of the effects of causation, omniscience and the corresponding intractability in an internal representation, consider a world consisting of 200 same-sized blocks which are situated on a two-dimensional plane (no stacking allowed). The reader might recall from Section 1.2 that the physical blocks correspond to S,, &+I and {xc, . . . , x,,} discussed in Figs. 1 and 2 . For an action such as moving a block, the property of spatial orientation among the blocks will change as the result of this action. One such useful representational property for a reasoning agent might be left-of( m, n) and not( left-of( m, n) ) used to describe the (x, y) locations of blocks relative to each other. These internal entities correspond to #S,, #$,+I and " The issue of precisely whnt a symbol is has always been a somewhat murky issue, and appears to depend on how one chooses to abstract the world in the setting of a particular world view. In the cognitive world view, a symbol is "meaningful"--e.g., something like the letter "A", the word "CAT', or a mental image of a cat. Examples of "meaningless" sub-symbols in connectionism are the "I", "\" and "-" features which constitute the letter "A". What is "meaningful" in either case seems to be more of a function of what is meaningful to the researcher, rather than what is meaningful to the intelligent agent being studied. {io,.
. . , int} that were discussed in Figs. 1 and 2 from Section 2.1. If one block is moved from its current (x, y) location (i.e., S,) to a new location (x', y') (i.e., Sri+++ ), the left-of(m, n) and not(Zef-of(m, n) ) relationships between it and the remaining 199 blocks in the internal representation must be checked, so as to maintain consistency, and updated to reflect the side-effects of this action (i.e., from #S,, to #$,+I ). If this checking is not done, contradictory or inconsistent facts about the world could arise in the internal representation. Most importantly, the frame problem would be encountered, since any change or lack of change would remain unknown. In the worst case, n2 causal relationships must be somehow reflected in the internal representation for each pair of (i.e., left-of, not( Zef-of) ) properties used to describe this world. For a world of 200 blocks, this would amount to 40,000 separate, unique Zef-of and not(lef-ofl pieces of knowledge, known as axioms. If we introduce a second property such as in-front-oflm, n) and not( in-front-of m, n) ), 40,000 additional axioms must be added to the representation bringing the total to 80,000. To fully represent the property of spatial orientation for 200 blocks, by the addition of right-of(m, n), not( right-of(m, n) ), behind(m, n) and not( behind( m, n) ) , 160,000 axioms would be required to fully represent the concept of spatial orientation in this world of 200 blocks. Space complexity is poor.
In a dynamic environment, the reasoning agent would have to attend to the plane of blocks on a relatively frequent basis since it, or some other external entity, could be responsible for the movement of one or more, even all of the blocks. For smooth detection assume that the internal representation must be updated twenty times per second. For 200 blocks this would mean that the update of each property in the representation could consume at most 0.0000003 125 seconds, or 0.3 125 microseconds, of machine processing time including the feature-based recognition of the blocks, attention, perception and the updating of the internal representation. Time complexity is poor. By present computing standards even this simple representation approaches the upper-limits of computational tractability. This is indicative of Hayes' (1987) argument against broad approaches to potential computational solutions (Section 1.1). Even allowing the circumvention of object recognition, attention and perception by abstracting the characterization of the external environment into very simple atoms (which is usually the case in this world view), one can see that by adding a few more properties, with stacking allowed, such as on-top( m, n) and not( on-top( m, n) ), the representation inevitably becomes computationally intractable. This simple scenario has not even taken into account what the reasoning agent does with the representation once it has been internalized; whether it be planning, problem solving or search. In a representation such as this, it is clear that below certain thresholds of complexity, the frame problem and related problems relating to the property of spatial orientation are "solved", or at least curtailed. But, it should also be apparent that the space and time complexity eventually attains intractability as the size and complexity of the agent's world increases (Chapman, 1987) .
Therefore, the preferred method to constrain this intractability has been for researchers to select domains of study in which most or all the characteristics of the environment atom are static. For intrinsically dynamic environments where static assumptions are prohibitive, the solution has been to constrain the complexity of the internal representation through abstraction, assumption and simplification of the entities in the external world. Most approaches first consider a static world hoping that the representation will "scale up" to the demands of a dynamic world. This is the principal reason why I have pursued the title of the book, Reasoning Agents in a Dynamic World, to such an extent. As Brooks (1991) recounted, the general divide-and-conquer strategy in early AI and cognitive science had been to decompose the domain of human and general biological intelligence into separate subdisciplines such as vision, perception, natural language, planning, robotics, and so forth, while maintaining the aspiration that the individual sub-problems would and could be solved as separate efforts. Once each of the sub-problems was solved, it was hypothesized that the individual solutions could then be reconstructed through integration and aggregation into the Final Solution. It should be obvious to the reader that this scientific strategy is symptomatic of the atomism intrinsic to the interactional world view.
The Tileworld architecture (Pollack & Ringuette, 1990 ) provides a superior example of an implemented intelligent reasoning system that is grounded in the tradition of the cognitive world view and which reasons about an unpredictable dynamic world. At present, Tileworld reasons about a dynamic, simulated environment which consists of approximately 150 abstracted objects. The Perception module (Fig. 7) performs no function in this architecture, with the assumption that the earlier phases of object recognition (e.g., Marr, 1982) , attention and perception have already occurred. Therefore, each object in the simulated environment is mapped to a corresponding internal representation (as was discussed in Fig. 2 from Section 1.2) which Tileworld's cognitive planning subsystem reasons about (Bratman, 1987) . In particular, this involves both immediate reasoning about the present and deliberative reasoning about the future. Information about the complete state of all 150 abstracted objects in its environment is periodically scanned and internalized into 150 corresponding internal objects; i.e., ".
the agent can access a global map of the world that indicates the locations of all objects ." (Pol-lack & Ringuette, 1990, p. 4) . This practice of updating the internal representation with a complete copy of the external world is symptomatic of the omniscience assumption. Instead of having to perform a worst-case update of twenty times per second however, as illustrated before with the 200 blocks, Tileworld curtails the frame problem by scanning the entire external world, then updating the internal representation with this information only on a demand-driven basis. Thus, any change, or non-change, in the environment is not reflected in the internal representation of the system until it is required by some aspect of the internal reasoning process. Once internalized, only the relevant entities are attended to. It is clear that Tileworld's approach to the frame problem is elegant, albeit with the assumption of omniscience intact (e.g., Haugh, Tenenberg). Both space and time complexity are very well constrained for a world of 150 abstracted objects. It is not clear however, how space and time complexity would scale up to the demands of a dynamic world comprising thousands or millions of objects.
There is also another point to be considered. Suppose for a moment, that a reasonable interactional divide-and-conquer solution to object recognition, the focusing of attention (e.g., Nutter) and perception were to arrive, thus providing Tileworld's Perception module with functionality. These questions, indeed, could be asked of any interactional approach to human or machine cognition. Would the integration of inputs, outputs, structures and processes within and between the Perception module and Tileworld's other modules be possible? For instance, since the characterization of the environment would be more concrete, perhaps comprising real physical entities as in Sandewall's traffic situation model, would the output of Tileworld's new Perception module be similar to its current output, an omniscient series of abstracted objects? With its new perceptual and attentional capabilities, the output of the Perception module would in all likelihood, comprise a non-omniscient subset of the external world, as described in Section 1.3 (Fig. 3) . But, how would this affect the extant internal reasoning structures and processes in Tileworld, which are singularly equipped to function with an omniscient internal representation of the world? Given the causally-governed bookkeeping problem illustrated in the example with the 200 blocks, the omniscient internal representation in Tileworld coupled with a non-omniscient attentional and perceptual module would mean that portions of the internal representation would not be updated with changing, relevant information about the world. This would eventually result in inconsistencies relating to change and lack of change, which as we already know is the frame problem. In other words, this kind of atomistic integration does not appear to be plausible, when representing a dynamic, unpredictable world. Given that systems such as Tileworld serve to promote principles of resource-boundedness and resource-limited reasoning (Pollack, 1992; Simon, 1955) , the assumption of omniscience, as it is realized in Tileworld's exhaustive internal representation of the world-which instead implies boundless resources via the frame problem-contradicts the very thesis it endeavors to help bring about. The reason I have pursued this tangent at such great length is to accentuate the fact that in the interactional world view, no matter how the researcher attempts to abstract the world, causal laws and their related consequences invariably underlie, and are intrinsic to, the ensuing representation.
From this originates the assumption of omniscience; in any representation which results from an abstraction in this world view, the researcher and the representation must be ready to account for all causal relationships between all atoms.
Recalling the discussion in Sections 1.2 and I .3, the fallacy of omniscience is that a true biological reasoning agent is neither aware of all objects and events in its world, within itself, nor of all causal relationships between objects. The frame problem falls out of this assumption since it inevitably becomes prohibitive, if not paradoxical, to represent all change and non-change in a causally-governed world. But, as Hayes aptly put it, "there doesn't seem to be any other way to do it, that is the frame problem" (1987, p. 125) [original emphasis].
(However, I will illustrate, later in Section 3.4, there are "other ways to do it", such that the frame problem is altogether avoidable.) Therefore, after the initial publication of the frame problem in 1969, most if not all, potential solutions have concentrated on strategies of elimination, reduction or minimization in order to restrict the prohibitive combinatorics, such as those illustrated in this Section, to a more tractable magnitude. As I have illustrated, Tileworld performs quite well within the limitations of omniscience and the frame problem. With the presence of atomism and causal relationships however, it appears that any potential approach in this world view, including Tileworld, inevitably attains a combinatorial asymptote as the size and complexity of the world increases (Chapman, 1987) , thus making the frame problem unavoidable.
The interactional world view in the book
With the exception of the chapters of Nutter, Perlis, Stein and Sandewall, for most of the contributions in the book, the interactional world view is pre-eminent in one form or another (see Table 1 ) Change, context and time are treated as separate dimensions. Even in the cases utilizing inferential statistics (e.g., Tenenberg, Weber), the approach is not immune from the standpoint of causal relationships. Rather than discrete, binary causes i.e., True or False, causes are instead assigned continuous probabilities ranging from 0 to 1. Regarding the representation of time, the approaches of Morgenstern and particularly Goodwin & Trudel also follow the tenets of the interactional world view. Time is treated as a dimension separate from other entities in the abstractions. Excluding the systems of Brown '* and Weld, the remaining contributions exist only in the early phases of conceptual development or as theoretical analyses. Keeping in mind the capabilities of the Tileworld architecture and the intractabilities imminent in the cognitive world view; I encourage the reader to ask: how effectively each of the proposed approaches in the book would scale up in a dynamic, fast-changing, unpredictable world consisting of hundreds or thousands of objects and events. There is another fundamental question that I encourage the reader to ask, or at least consider: if the frame problem, in all likelihood, "point[ s] up a basic error in the way we try to describe the everyday world" (Hayes, 1987) , could one consider alternate ways to (a) look at and (b) describe intelligent phenomena? This is precisely the kind of question Stein asks in her chapter. Particularly for those researchers that are plagued with issues relating to unpredictable and dynamic worlds, other world views exist in which the frame problem may either be attenuated, or simply does not exist. These issues owe to the manner by which elements and relationships are characterized between and within the agent and environment. Two '* Brown's chapter proposes and describes an implementation of a software meta-language which combines features from a wide variety of logics. such candidates are the organismic and transactional world views. These are not widely known and might be awkward to apprehend in the present setting of human and machine cognition. I will do my best however, to explicate them below in relation to the book and this discussion.
The organismic world view
The organismic world view involves a separation of agent and environment as in the interactional world view. However, regarding the agent, "organismic approaches require an appreciation of how elements fit together in terms of system-wide principles of organization" (Altman & Rogoff, 1987, p. 19) . Any element therefore, must be analyzed in the context of the whole system. The whole of the agent is characterized as more than the sum of its parts (i.e., Gestalt). In turn, "organismic world views consider the whole and certain part-whole relationships to be the proper unit of analysis . . . " (Altman & Rogoff, 1987, p. 19) . Regarding causality, rather than an emphasis on uni-directional, cause-effect relationships between atoms which is reminiscent of the interactional world view (e.g., Fig. 6 ), causality can be reciprocal (e.g., bi-directional), can follow multiple paths, and can also assume complex patterns. Regarding time and change, the organismic world view stresses teleological mechanisms which "pull" the organism towards certain "ideal states", also known as homeostasis; whereupon time and change cease to be relevant. The organismic world view also permits a separation of the analysis of the agent and the environment. The intra-agent elements are contextdependent. Regarding the agent and the environment however, time, change and context are separate entities, much as in the interactional world view.
Certain connectionist models for instance, reflect most aspects of the organismic world view. The interactive activation model of McLelland & Rumelhart ( 1981) consists of an interconnected network of linguistic "units" at the feature (i.e., sub-symbolic), letter and word level which share either excitatory or inhibitory bi-directional relationships with each other. As the constituents of a printed word such as "CAT" for example, are presented to such a network, the feature units (e.g., I'/", "\", "-") become activated, which in turn activate letter units (e.g., "C", "A", "'I"). The activation spreads through the entire system until the word units (e.g., "CAT"), and presumably other concepts related to "CAT", such as "MORRIS", are activated as well. As the end-result of this spreading i.e., once homeostasis or the "final state" is attained, most units associated with a cat are fully excited and other similar, yet unrelated entities, such as "BAT" and "CAR" are inhibited. Nutter's contribution in the book is akin to the organismic world view and proposes a spreading activation model similar to McLelland & Rumelhart. Nutter's is designed to focus the attention of the agent only to those concepts that are relevant in a model of a static world. Sandewall's contribution also adheres to most aspects of the organismic world view. Rather than the spreading of activation though, he seeks a system of dynamic frames wherein the selection and activation of frames is contingent on higher-order parameters extracted from the environment via physical sensors.
In all three of these cases, however, omniscience is still a factor which contributes to the characterization of the relationship between the agent and the environment; and ultimately the internal representation.
The reason why owes to the quality intrinsic to the organismic world view which treats the agent and environment as separate entities. Even though the elements within the agent are context-dependent, the agent is still context-independent with respect to the environment (see Table 1 ). The causal universals intrinsic to the interactional world view thus also affect the organismic world view in much the same fashion. To put this another way, even though causality in the organismic world view can be complex, multi-directional, reciprocal and even teleological, it still carries along with it the same pernicious assumption of omniscience. Nutter's internalized static "world model" for instance, must ultimately account for every object and event in the external world. Moreover, for each of these three approaches, when something changes in the environment, the change must be acknowledged by the reasoning agent in order for the internal representation to remain consistent. This, as we have already observed, gives birth to the frame problem.
The transactional world view
The transactional world view considers the agent and environment as being melded into indivisible, inseparable contexts.
The transactional approach is . the study of the changing relations among psychological and environmental aspects of holistic unities. [emphasis removed] The transactional whole is not composed of separate elements but is a con$uence of inseparable factors that depend on one another for their very definition and meaning. Furthermore, transactional approaches focus on the changing relationships among aspects of the whole, both as a tool for understanding a phenomenon and because temporal processes are an integral feature of the person-environment whole.
[Unlike the organismic and interactional world views] the transactional world view does not deal with the relationship between elements, in the sense that one independent element may cause changes in, affect, or inlluence another element. Instead, a transactional approach assumes that the aspects of a system, that is, person and context, coexist and jointly define one another and contribute to the meaning and nature of a holistic event. [original emphasis] (Altman & Rogoff, 1987, p. 24) The unit of analysis is, in principle, purely contextual. Hence elements, also referred to as "aspects", of both the agent and the environment, including change and context, can only be described in terms of each other. In her chapter, Stein pursues ideals such as these regarding her attempt to describe the world in terms of acausal, atemporal counterfactuals rather than through temporal and causal logics. The transactional world view has also been realized in disciplines such as situated action (Suchman, 1987; Agre, 1993; Chapman, 1991; Agre & Chapman, 1987 , 1991 , situation theory (Devlin, 1991; Barwise & Perry, 1983) , the theory of affordances (Gibson, 1979) , subsumption architectures (Brooks, 199 1) , activity theory (Wertsch, 1991; Vygotsky, 1986) , psychology (Greeno, 1989) and psycholinguistics (Van Orden et al., 1991) . Fig. 8 illustrates, in a superficial way, a diagrammatic characterization of the relationship be- tween the agent and the environment in this world view. The diagram highlights the attributes of cognition intrinsic to the agent which correspond to distinctive features germane to the environment, typically realized as activity. Note that the linear conception of time-past, present, future-in the interactional sense, is absent from this world view. Causality also lacks any tangible interpretation in this world view in the sense of antecedent-consequent, cause-effect, or input-output relationships among "atoms" (e.g., Figs. 6 and 7), since they do not exist in this world view. Now it is necessary, to once again get at the biological and mechanical crux of the frame problem.
Interpretations of attention and perception in the cognitive world view
Backtracking a bit, the cognitive world view explicated earlier considers cognition as a centralized, information-theoretic management system for abstracted information. This abstracted information has presumably been extracted from the environment via the faculties of attention and perception. Hence, attention and perception have historically been idealized as processes that are ancillary rather than essential to cognition; i.e., their foremost roles have been to acknowledge incoming stimuli from the world (e.g., Fig. 6 ) and reconstruct such stimuli into internalized, abstracted collections of objects, or "symbols". These internalized symbols are then presumably manipulated by myriad internal "cognitive processes" (e.g., Fig. 7 ). In the cognitive world view there are two prevailing interpretations regarding the roles of attention and perception and how they relate to cognition; (1) a mechanistic, or machine, interpretation and (2) a biological, or human, interpretation.
In the mechanistic interpretation (Section 1.2), because of the assumption of omniscience, (a) the role of perception has been to extract each and every entity from the environment, and (b) the capabilities of attention, are instead, utilized internally as part of the cognitive reasoning process, such as they are in Tileworld, focusing on relevant and salient aspects of the internal representation, rather than the external representation.
In the biological interpretation (Section 1.3)) by contrast, the typical functions ascribed to the phenomena of perception and attention are: (a) object individuation and recog-nition capabilities (e.g., Marr, 1982) , and (b) an attentional mechanism which allows the system to focus only on relevant and salient entities that are present in the external, perceptual (e.g., visual) flux (e.g., Treisman, 1985; Allport, 1989; Wolfe, 1992) . The precise relationships between the functions of attention, perception and cognition in either interpretation have historically remained elusive, since these three functions have been treated as separate sub-disciplines in accord with the divide-and-conquer atomism intrinsic to the interactional world view. To put it another way, the nature of the "interfaces" between these three functionally disparate entities remain unclear. Thus, even within the same world view, there are major discrepancies between the interpretations of human and machine cognition and what the roles of attention and perception are in either. ' 3
The presence of omniscience in machine cognition versus the ostensible absence of it in human cognition appears to be one of the primary sticking points in the cognitive world view. In the biological, or human interpretation (Section 1.3), attention is one of the earlier processes to occur. In the machine interpretation (Section 1.2)) such as in Tileworld, attention is one of the later processes to occur. This inconsistency in the machine interpretation of the cognitive world view, when abstracted and realized in a representation, has been the basis for many of the nonmonotonic, and temporal persistence issues addressed in the book (e.g. Haugh, Weber, Goodwin & Trudel) and elsewhere. Lacking any other way around this, the methodological, tractable and representational constraints intrinsic to the cognitive world view typically result in the simplifying assumption that the "output" of attention and perception (e.g., Fig. 7 ) is simply an omniscient stream of abstracted objects-constituting many of the approaches to the frame problem and the family of nonmonotonic logics. For many of the contributions in the book, this assumption is realized in representations which ignore attention and perception outright, and which only reason about abstracted objects that have been presumably processed by attention and perception (see Table 1 ) . By the same token, some of the very same contributions (e.g., Etherington et al.) argue that salience, relevance and the focus of attention, functions that are intrinsic to the biological interpretations of attention and perception, are vital to the "solution" to the frame problem. The theoretical gulf that separates these two conflicting interpretations of human and machine intelligence is thus, quite vast.
Interpretation of attention and perception in the trmsactional world view
In the transactional world view by contrast, the agent, environment and the relationship between the two are all considered as a single, unified unit of analysis. Thus, it is impossible to presume intelligence to be solely "internal" to the agent as it typically is in the interactional and the organismic world views. Both biological and mechanistic transactional interpretations of these three functions, such as discussed in Section 1.3, focus more directly on the "confluence" of agent and environment. From " These incongruencies are typically rationalized by arguing that the goals of AI and certain forms of cognitive science are not necessarily to follow strict biological principles. But the willingness to embrace a biological phenomenon when it suits the purpose of a non-biological approach (e.g., "perception", "cognition", "attention", "memory") belies this posture. the perspective of developing requirements for a computational architecture, particularly for a representation, such interpretations differ markedly from what have historically been considered the "standard", mainstream representations in AI and cognitive science. Since transactional aspects, rather than internalized abstractions of the environment are the primary unit of analysis, the biological functions that negotiate most directly with such agent-environment aspects are first perception and attention, then cognition. There currently exist a few intelligent architectures, in which the developers have focused their efforts on the functions of perception and attention and the relation of these externally to the environment, as well as internally to cognition in attempts to capture this "confluence". These approaches take on many of the characteristics of the transactional world view. Most noteworthy have been Brooks' insect-like robotic creatures (1991), Pengi (Agre & Chapman, 1991) and Sonja (Chapman, 1991) . The mode of representation is known as a deictic. A prototypical verbalization of a deictic is:
the-cup-I-am-drinking-from. (Agre, 1993) This deictic neither uniquely denotes an internal structure or process, an external object, nor an action, such as would be described in the situation calculus. Referring to Fig. 8 , a deictic such as the-cup-l-am-drinking-from entails aspects of (a) the environment, fromthe-cup; (b) the agent, Z-am; and (c) the activity, I-am-dtinking. The reader should not be misled however, into believing that a deictic is somehow decomposable into three subordinate categories. The Gestalt property of the deictic is also akin to what Gibson (1979) had distinguished by name as the ufloniance. As a consequence, in deictic representations, the relationship between agent and environment possess most of the qualities that are intrinsic to the transactional world view.
As an example, the video game domain which Pengi reasons about, called Pengo, contains hundreds of moving objects, and change is fast, as well as unpredictable. The Pengi domain (Fig. 9) comprises (a) a single penguin which is manipulated by the Pengi system, (b) several predatory bees which can either kill the penguin or be killed by the penguin, and (c) about two hundred cubes of ice-some of which can be kicked by the penguin at a predatory bee in order to kill it. The design strategy chosen by the developers of Pengi was to avoid the intractabilities inherent in omniscient, interactional world view approaches. Instead of omnisciently internalizing the world, as Tileworld does, Pengi treats external objects and events in the world, and its transactions with them, as the principal representation. The objects in the Pengi domain are thus individuated into deictic elements such as the-penguin, the-ice-cube, the-enemy-bee, and so forth. In this non-omniscient fashion, the-enemy-bee might refer to a particular bee in one situation, but perhaps a different bee in another situation; contingent perhaps on the property of physical proximity between the-penguin and an infinite set of potentially threatening enemy-bees. Then, activities entailing many potential situations in which the-penguin might find itself, comprising objects and events (i.e., changes in property discussed in Sections 1.2 and 1.3), are also represented deictically.
The implementation of these transactions are grounded in Ullman's (1984) visual routines. These basic perceptual procedures are postulated to transpire at the stage of intermediate vision after object detection and individuation have taken place (Marr, 1982) .
the-wall-of-cubes
Fig. 9. Situated use of visual routines in Pengi (view is from above)
Visual routines are theorized to co-occur with other attentional and higher-order processes which help constrain, or make salient, only those entities in the visual field that are relevant in the current context; other irrelevant entities are simply ignored. I4 Fig. 9 illustrates two visual routines, known as markers and ruys, which allow Pengi to "visualize" a way to maneuver the-penguin next to a cube of ice in order to kick it at a predatory bee and kill it. This particular scenario is best described by the following deictic: Finding the-projectile-cube-to-kick-at-the-bee when lurking behind the-wall-of-cubes, Based on the situation depicted in Fig. 9 , the Pengi system wishes to kill the-bee using the cube-kicking capabilities of the-penguin. Two visual routines are utilized that work directly with the visual information "perceived" from the video screen. So in order to locate the cube that the-penguin should kick in order to kill the-bee, two rays are traced. The first ray (ray-l) is traced along the-wallof-cubes in a vertical fashion where the candidate projectile-cubes are known to be. The second ray (ray-2), which reflects the flight path of the-bee is traced indefinitely in a horizontal direction until it intersects with another ray, in this case (ray-l). A marker is "dropped" where these two rays, (ray-l) and (ray-:!), intersect, yielding theprojectile-cube that should be kicked. The very next situation (not illustrated) would then locate the-penguin adjacent to the-projectile-cube so that it can be kicked at the bee. Regarding abstraction and representation, note that such visual activity, involving markers and rays, is not conveniently captured in an atomistic representation like predicate logic. But this is not to imply that Pengi is "representationless", contrary to Brooks' ( 1991) argument. It simply means that at present, Pengi escapes a convenient nomenclature, hence, the deictic verbalizations. l5 Also note that even though approximately two hundred blocks of ice and many moving, potentially predatory bees comprise the overall state in the Pengi game, only focused situations relevant to Pengi's purview, such as the one depicted in Fig. 9 , are reasoned about. The other objects and events are simply ignored until they become relevant in another situation. This is characteristic of the non-omniscient scenario discussed in Section 1.3 where it was described how actual and potential mappings between external objects and internal representations can either be present or absent (Fig. 3) . Since Pengi reasons about information external to it in terms of itself and the world, omniscience and internal bookkeeping problems do not exist the way they do in the interactional world view. Thus, both space and time complexity remain within very reasonable, biologically plausible limits. The Pengi system is not without its critics however. Although the planning-like reasoning that Pengi exhibits is emergent and mirrors certain aspects of standard temporal projection paradigms, it can only reason about its present context. Reasoning forward in time, such as is accomplished in Tileworld, is not possible. Since Pengi is an atemporal and acausal system, it is not equipped to reason about dimensions such as time and causality-partly owing to the transactional world view.
The transactional world view: no frame problem
The Pengi system focuses its "attention" to the current, relevant context that is defined both in terms of the environment and the agent. This is accomplished through the aggregation of simple attentional and perceptual operations known as visual routines. The functions of these routines are mediated by internal "combinational networks", the analog to cognitive processes, which essentially decide what set of routines are relevant within a given context. The objects in the environment remain external to the reasoning agent and are not internalized.
Hence, Pengi does not have to worry about what has changed and what has not changed with respect to the entire set of two hundred or so objects which make up the game. In fact, if thousands or millions of the same objects were added to the game, neither space nor time complexity would be affected. Owing to the tenets of the transactional world view, Pengi and the situated environment are a unified whole, therefore agent, environment, change, causality, time and action are inseparable. The objects and events outside of Pengi's purview are simply ignoredchange or lack of change relating to what is ignored does not matter; there is not an internal representation of the external world; hence, no need for an assumption of omniscience and more importantly, no potential for a frame problem. In fact, there is no frame problem in this incarnation of the transactional world view.
The principal feature offered by the transactional world view, and the example provided by Pengi, is that many of the requirements set forth by the contributors in the I5 There have been recent developments in the realm of situation theory (Devlin, 1991) attempting to formalize such ideas. It is very clear that many of the contributors in the book are completely aware of the requirements that would lead a given approach away from omniscience and the frame problem. Unfortunately, with the exception of Stein and Perlis, the proposed solutions are carried out from the vantage point of the interactional or organismic world views, which as I have already argued, are predisposed to assumptions of omniscience and the frame problem. These distinctions are summarized in Table 1 .
World view "roundup"
In the last three sections, I have attempted to describe a continuum that points up various perspectives through which the researcher might choose to characterize the relationship between a reasoning agent and its environment. At one end of the continuum, known as the interactional world view, such phenomena are decomposable into arbitrarily complex "atoms" which exhaustively share cause-effect relationships with each other. It was discussed that within this world view, exist the assumption of omniscience and the frame problem. The Tileworld architecture was illustrated as an example of this world view in which the omniscience assumption regarding external-internal mappings are intact, yet the frame problem is curtailed through a selective sampling of a complete copy of the world on a need-to-know basis. This perspective places little or no emphasis on biological perception and attention, and instead, focuses on internal cognitive processes that reason about complete, internalized copies of the external world. Anchoring the opposite end of the continuum, is the transactional world view, in which the agent and environment comprise an inseparable, embeddedness in context. Likewise, the Pengi architecture was presented as an exemplar of this world view in which it was demonstrated that omniscience and the frame problem do not exist. Following the agent-environment-action qualities of the deictic representation, this perspective emphasizes attention and perception in which cognition serves only a mediatory role between the agent and the environment, in terms of deciding which action to select next, given the demands of the present situation. This view supports many of the requirements idealized in the book. By focusing only on relevant and salient aspects of the situation, all else can be ignored, and a frame problem does not exist. Finally, somewhere in the middle of this spectrum lies the organismic world view, in which the agent comprises a holistic entity, yet the separability between the agent and the environment still exists, much like the interactional world view.
Thus, the question remains, what does each world view have to offer to the realms of research in human and machine cognition? Also, are these world views mutually exclusive, or, as has been accomplished in other sciences such as physics and biology, might they be better utilized and integrated to produce more powerful and explanatory theoretical frameworks? For instance, in Perlis' discussion, he provides compelling examples which show that it is sometimes necessary to remember, as well as reason about, past experiences from which certain facts might either be congruent or contradictory with similar or identical facts relevant in the present situation. Since humans appear to exhibit the phenomenon of being able to reason about time; past, present and future, this is clearly a trait that is part and parcel of an interactional world view-where time is treated as a separate dimension. However, given what we now know about omniscience and the frame problem (by way of this review), reasoning about time in the interactional world view, particularly in an unpredictable and dynamic world, has severe limitations. We also know that the transactional world view does not inherently possess such limitations, however this world view is also atemporal and acausal. Thus, I pose the question, might it be possible to develop abstraction and representation methodologies which combine desirable aspects from some or all of these current, or to-be-discovered, world views? In the case of Tileworld and Pengi, for instance, could aggregations of J.A. 7ih/Artificial Intelligence 73 (1995) transactional Pengi-like situations be reasoned about along an interactional Tileworld-like dimension of time?
In order to provide a sketch of this, Fig. IO depicts a visualization in which transactional dimensions, realized as four distinct sets of situations, S, #S, ##S, and #MS, are organized along the interactional dimension of time from t -n to t + m, i.e., past, present and future. The two sets of situations, S and #S, reflect the "standard' nonomniscient external-internal mapping (i.e., Fig. 3 rotated 90 degrees) at a present time t. Recalling the discussion from Section 1.3, once transactions among situations are learned or remembered through experience, they are then internalized, and realized as the phenomenon of long-term memory. Thus, in Fig. 10 , ##MS reflects a very large set of transactional situations, perhaps organized along, but certainly not constrained to, the interactional dimension of time, from t -1 to t-n, that reflect learned, past transactional experiences. l6 Likewise, #MS reflects a set of "working memory"-like (e.g., Baddeley, 1986) transactional situations, that comprise the present course of reasoning, as in Tileworld, which draws from past experiences, ###S, as well as from the environment, S and its immediate perceptions of the environment, #S. Potential situations about the future, from t + 1 to t + m, are temporarily "deliberated" about as alternatives in ##S, before being committed to in ###S.
Thus, one can see that the phenomenon of attention and perception, through a transactional perspective, is not only utilized for the immediate negotiation between agent (#S) and environment (S) as it is in Pengi, but is also generalized to involve the phenomena of working memory (##S) and long-term memory (#f###S) (e.g., Schneider & Detweiler, 1987) . In this scenario, attention is not only an aspect of the canonical biological variety, such as the use of visual routines in Pengi, but is also "turned inward", as is currently reflected in the omniscient internal reasoning structure of Tileworld. The phenomenon of mental imagery (Kosslyn, 1983) illustrates one way in which perception and attention might be directed inward in the presence and absence of external stimuli. An integrated architecture such as the one described in Fig. 10, I maintain, is congruent with many of the requirements advanced by the various contributors in the book in terms of (a) avoiding the frame problem altogether, (b) conforming to what is know to occur biologically (e.g., Olshausen et al., 1992) , and (c) still accurately capturing certain phenomena of human intelligence, non-omnisciently, such as reasoning about time. Architecturally, these two dimensions might be subsumed by a larger system-wide dimension, or dimensions, in which system-wide principles in one, two or all three world views, negotiate interactions and/or transactions between the interactional (t -n to t + m) and transactional dimensions (S, #S, #MS, ##MS) so-far discussed. As in Perlis' example, or like in Tileworld, such information drawn from the past (#MS) might bear on reasoning that takes place in the present (S, #S> and about the future (##S) , even if the information that crosses temporal boundaries (via mappings, Fig. 10 ) is contradictory. This scenario is also loosely related, but certainly not isomorphic, to Stein's reasoning about counterfactual worlds.
Conclusion
In this review, I have attempted to accomplish several things. Foremost, I have tried to organize and highlight some of the major contributions in the book. I have also attempted to show how the presence or absence of the frame problem is dependent on the scientific perspective, or world view, through which the researcher in AI or cognitive science chooses to perform his or her research activities. I have endeavored to demonstrate that the frame problem is present in the interactional and organismic world views yet is absent in the transactional world view. The reason why pertains to the relationship between the agent and environment, as interpreted by the researcher, from the perspective of one of these scientific world views. The characterization of time, causality, change and context, ultimately bear on this relationship. A journey quite far afield has been required in order to sufficiently integrate, to my satisfaction, the contents of the book, and what it represents to AI and cognitive science as well as to the reader of this review and the reader of the book. Each contribution in the book, as I have discussed, is representative of one, two, or all three world views. Given the broader philosophical and methodological issues that have been explicated and pursued in this review, I believe that the frame problem has been cast into a stronger and more convincing exegetic role.
Science is human activity. When scientists encounter naturally-occurring phenomena, by working with existing tools and methods, as well as creating new ones-hypotheses, observations, experiments, theories, frameworks, paradigms, world views and social movements are constructed. Underneath all of this however, remains the simple fact that any observer of Nature is simply observing, but is never completely capable of explaining what he or she has observed. Owing to the cultural milieu in which any scientific observer is active, tendencies towards certain world views, tools, methods and so forth are fostered. Some of these tendencies originate by individual choice, others are constrained by sociocultural and historical factors, such as meeting the needs or expectations of the benefactor funding the research. Yet others are privileged or conform to a particular genre (Wertsch, 1991, pp. 124 and 135) . Conventional scientific wisdom might suggest that scientists gain glimpses at ultimate, immutable truths about nature by way of scientific discovery. The truth however, I maintain, is in the eye of the beholder; thus, there are at least as many truths as there are people. Moreover, the semiotic devices, realized as accepted tools and nomenclatures, serve scientists well in order to mediate and collectivize their activities (Merrell, 1982; Wertsch, 1991) .
I have few opinions about which world view is the "right" one to pursue in AI or cognitive science. I do have many opinions however, about what is reasonable within a given world view-and I encourage the reader of the book to entertain such opinions as well. Thus, attempting to establish a theory of context from an interactional perspective could prove to be a fruitless enterprise, since it appears to be better suited for development from a transactional outlook. On the other hand, there are many aspects of human and machine cognition that are fundamentally interactional, such as that of reasoning about time in the work of Pollack and Bratman. Or, consider the case where a researchet in human or machine cognition ascribes a term such as "internal structure" or "internal process" to an intelligent phenomenon. It should not be unrealistic to expect this researcher to: (a) explain how the structure or process deals with intractabilities such as the frame problem, (b) if simplifying assumptions are made, such as an abstracted static world, or an omniscient internal representation of the world, how the researcher intends to "scale up" the structure or process to the demands of a real-world situation and (c) what is the goodness of fit between human and machine cognition as it pertains to the structure or process.
In the Introduction, I had provided the analogy that the frame problem is similar to well-known mathematical intractabilities, such as the inability to divide any number by zero or infinity. Coincidental to this review, recent developments in cosmological physics, in attempts to describe the origins of the universe, have forced a re-interpretation of the linear concept of time (past, present, future) to a dimension of "imaginary time" in order to overcome certain mathematical intractabilities (Hawking, 1988) . The crux of the problem involves the singularity at the moment, or "time zero", at which the Big Bang is postulated to have occurred. At this singular moment, all laws of physics are invalid since the descriptive equations, owing to the value of time being zero, call for denominators that involve the quantity of infinity (cc), which is mathematically impossible. A proposed solution to this problem has been achieved by a shift from a temporal, interactional perspective to an atemporal, quasi-transactional characterization of time. By reinterpreting time as a nonlinear, holistic aspect of the universe, this singularity is eliminated and imposes the alternate view of the universe as an atemporal phenomenon in which the universe simply "is", for lack of a better word, rather than "was", "is" and "will be" (past, present, future). In other words, in this alternate view, describing the evolution of the universe is not contingent on the dimension of time, thus altogether avoiding the "time zero" singularity. I only call on this example to emphasize the analogy between it and what we have seen to be true of the frame problem intrinsic to the interactional and organismic world views versus the absence of the frame problem in the transactional world view. This leads me to suggest that any strides toward "unification" (e.g., (Newell, 1990) which posits an ostensibly interactional unification, although some would disagree) could be better served in two, three or even other to-be-discovered world views (a sketch of which was illustrated in the last section; e.g., Fig. lo) , as has been achieved in other scientific disciplines.
A topic not given much coverage in this review has been the role of the observer as it relates to a phenomenon. The discipline of physics has had much experience with this. For instance:
Whereas transactional perspectives, exemplified by relativity and quantum theories in physics, consider the position and rate of movement of observers to be part of the phenomenon, interactional perspectives (including the Newtonian approach in physics) assume that observers are separate from the phenomenon and that observation can be done without the observer's influencing or altering the phenomenon. (Altman dz Rogoff, 1987, p. 18) It is no secret that scientific progress in human and machine cognition has been painfully slow, and this partly owes to the complexity of the problem-the mind often being characterized as the single, most intricate phenomenon in the observable universe. Advances in Human and Machine Cognition ultimately rest on scientific activity which as already mentioned, is carried out by people. Therefore, the most significant role that I see the scientific observer as having, is the awareness that she or he in point of fact, does play a role in all of this.
